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The stigmatisation of families of people in prison has been well-documented in research which explored the
experiences of these families. However there has, to date, been very little theorisation of this phenomenon. This
article proposes a model of stigmatisation that brings together social psychological work on opinion formation,
sociological work on stigma, and analyses of neoliberalism to construct a theoretical framework for analysing why
someone associated to a in prison might experience stigma. It argues that stereotypes play a strong role in
demonising both people who offend and their families, which is exacerbated by the fact that many of these
families are drawn from marginalised backgrounds. Thus, the proposed model considers both courtesy stigma, but
also stigma associated with class, race, and poverty. Moreover, it is argued that neoliberalism as a political and
economic project has further weaponised this stigma, turning the socially excluded into deviant “others” to be
shunned and feared. The stigma families of people in prison report is thus both multi-faceted and cumulative. It
originates from their link to someone in prison and their socially excluded backgrounds, and is magnified by
neoliberalism. Understanding this complexity allows us to fully comprehend not only why these families are
stigmatised, but also to develop the scholarship on stigma more broadly by drawing on social psychology. Finally,
it helps us develop an understanding of how neoliberal punitivism reaches beyond the people in prison and into
the lives of those related to them.1. Introduction
Research on the experiences of families of people in prison has
explored the numerous ways in which penal power extends its reach into
their lives in a process that has been called ‘secondary prisonisation’
(Comfort, 2009). This is defined as the extent to which the pains and
deprivations associated with imprisonment are felt by the families of
those in prison (Comfort, 2007). These include financial difficulties,
practical challenges associated with visiting and otherwise maintaining
contact, stigma and coping with grief-like emotions (see Condry, Kotova,
& Minson, 2016 for an overview). A key theme highlighted within this
literature is stigmatisation. This is defined as a ‘discrediting attribute’
(Goffman, 1963) that makes one morally lower than others. Attributes
may be physical (eg skin colour) or invisible (eg one's status as someone
who committed a criminal offence). A variant of this concept usually
utilised in the context of families of people in prison (eg Condry, 2007) is
‘courtesy stigma’: the process through which one's identity is tainted by
virtue of their association with the directly stigmatised individual
(Goffman, 1963). Thus, the process of stigmatising is a manifestation of a
negative value judgement.May 2020; Accepted 8 May 2020
evier B.V. This is an open access aThis article argues that we need to return to Goffman's original con-
ceptualisation of stigma as a social phenomenon, and go beyond simply
recounting instances of stigmatisation, as the current literature on fam-
ilies of people in prison has thus far tended to do (Comfort, 2007; May,
2000; Condry, 2007; Fishman, 1990). It asks: what are the social, eco-
nomic, cultural and political forces involved in these families being
stigmatised? It seeks to develop the literature on stigma of families of
people in prison by engaging with the macro-dynamics involved in
stigmatisation in order to develop the wealth of micro-level evidence of
how individual families of people in prison are stigmatised.
In constructing a theoretical framework of stigma of families of
people in prison, this article begins with the social psychological work on
opinion formation, which is arguably the natural starting point for any
analysis of stigma but has thus far not been engaged with by scholars
interested in families of people in prison. This social psychological work
outlines the importance of (negative) stereotypes, which are key to
stigmatisation. The article then discusses the stereotypes about people in
prison and their families, and how the media and political discourses
strengthen these stereotypes, thus exacerbating stigma. Finally, it argues
that neoliberalism further weaponises stigma and portrays excludedrticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
1 This refers to control and restrain techniques used on prisoners.
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This is critical because, as will be discussed, many families of people in
prison are drawn from socially excluded backgrounds, and the intersec-
tion of their link to someone in prison and their socio-economic status
(and ethnicity and gender), and how these shape stigma, has not yet been
analysed.
This article uses existing research on families’ experiences of stigma
to evidence the theoretical claims made. This articles draws on a review
of existing literature that focuses or touches on stigma experienced by
families of people in prison across, including work conducted in the UK,
Europe and the US. Since this field is relatively small, albeit growing, the
author is confident that a thorough review of literature was conducted.
Publications were searched for any discussion of stigma and further for
any discussion of direct stigma associated with characteristics such as
poverty or race. This work on families of people in prison is then married
to sociological research on stigmatisation in the context of poverty and
other stigmatised characteristics, and uses these empirical works to
construct a theoretical framework utilising social psychological research
on opinion formation.
It is recognised that much work is yet to be done if we are to un-
derstand what drives the stigma experienced by different groups of
families of people in prison, including Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME)
families. The framework developed here allows for the complexity and
heterogeneity of experiences to be analysed and encourages future re-
searchers to engage with the sociological complexity of stigmatisation. It
also shows that stigmatisation is a dynamic process that occurs within a
specific socio-political context, and that in order to fully analyse the
experiences of legally innocent families of people in prison, the role of
social injustices needs to be understood. In engaging with these issues,
this article aims to take the discussion of stigma beyond ‘courtesy stigma’
and highlight how families are stigmatised both because they are con-
nected to someone in prison, and because they themselves are often
marginalised. This article focuses on the UK context, but the theoretical
framework is flexible and therefore it might be possible to apply this to
other jurisdictions and contexts (such as experiences of families of people
who use drugs).
2. A return to a sociological approach to stigma
Analyses of the experience of families of people in prison ought to
move beyond simply analysing instances of stigmatisation and fear of
stigma, and view stigma as Goffman (1963) did. According to him,
stigmatisation operates as an instrument of power rather than simply
being an individual's reaction to someone with a discrediting charac-
teristic. Stigmatisation, thus, involves separating people into ‘us’ and
‘them’, which is an inherently social process. As Tyler and Slater (2018,
p. 727) argue, there needs to be greater ‘consideration of the social
causes, and indeed the political function of particular modalities of
stigma production’. This implies that we cannot see stigma as a solely
bottom-up process of individuals reacting negatively to other individuals,
and ought to explore how stigma comes to be within specific
socio-political contexts. After all, as will be shown in this article, the
reactions they might receive as not just relatives of someone in prison but
also as people drawn overwhelmingly from socio-economically margin-
alised populations.
Despite research (May, 2000; Condry, 2007; Comfort, 2007),
demonstrating, in rich qualitative detail, the micro-level instances of
social and institutional stigmatisation experienced by families, there is a
dearth of theoretical exploration of the sociological processes at work.
Condry (2007) has theorised why ‘courtesy stigma’ occurs in her book on
the shame and stigma experienced by families of serious offenders.
Despite her focus, her concept of a ‘web of shame’ can be applied to the
experiences of all families of people in prison. The ‘web of shame’ refers
to a number of strands through which stigma is transferred from the
person in prison to their relatives outside. Some relatives, such as par-
ents, reported being seen as being of the same ’bad stock’ as their2imprisoned relative. In addition, relatives were sometimes deemed to
have failed in their duty to prevent the offending behaviour, and others
were directly blamed for being causally linked to the offending – for
example, parents were blamed for not bringing up their children to be
law-abiding citizens. Implicit in Condry's research is the notion that
stigmatisation does not occur individualistically at a micro-level only –
the biologistic stereotype, for example, is a powerful cultural stereotype.
In order to ensure we meaningfully return to a sociological approach
to stigma, this paper will use micro-level approaches to opinion forma-
tion drawn from social psychology. These approaches provide the foun-
dations for a theoretical framework for understanding how negative
opinions about families of people in prison are formed. Nonetheless,
there is also a need to ensure macro-dynamics are engaged with.
Although social psychology has a sense of the social, sociology (such as
the work of Tyler, discussed below) addresses socio-political contexts in
much more detail. Therefore, this paper marries these two approaches to
develop a robustly sociological analytical framework.
3. The process of generalised opinion formation
Stereotypes are integral to stigma (Goffman, 1963). Qualitative
micro-level research shows that negative stereotypes about families of
people in prison are prevalent. In her work on families visiting prisons in
England and Wales, Hutton (2018) reported that families were cognisant
of being stereotyped by some prison staff as being badly behaved and
untrustworthy simply because they were visiting a prisoner. Hutton also
overheard an officer referring to a child visitor as a ‘C and R kid’,1
referring to a bored child's behaviour as if akin to an adult in prison
breaking rules. US wives of men in prison also experienced a wide range
of stigmatisatory behaviour because communities ‘expect[ed] them to
account for their husband's criminal acts' (Fishman, 1990, p. 119). These
empirical data clearly illustrate ‘courtesy stigma’.
It should however be noted that empirical research also found that
families often fear stigma to a greater extent than they actually experi-
ence it. Fishman, for example, found that ‘wives anticipated evaluations
from community members more often than they actually encountered
them’ (Fishman, 1990, p. 119). This should be included in the definition
of stigmatisation, however, because even feared stigma can still be a
powerful experience - some women for instance felt so stigmatised they
did not leave their homes (May 2000). Considering fear of stigma can
therefore inform us about how these families feel they are perceived by
society regardless of any abuse or shunning taking place.
Other empirical findings indicate families can be stereotyped by vir-
tue of their socio-economic status. Moore (2016: 36), in her US thesis,
found that wives of men in prison felt that society stereotyped them as
uneducated, deviant and/or gullible. One participant said society saw
women like her as ‘bottom of the barrel’ (Moore, 2016, p. 36). In the UK,
Foster (2017, p. 209) also found that ‘prisoners’ families are often poor…
[which] also involves experiencing stigma and shame stemming from
this experience’, though she did not explore this aspect of stigma in
detail. These findings highlight the need to explore direct stigma as well
as ‘courtesy stigma’, because ‘the most profound stigmatisation often
occurs at the intersection of multiple forms of exclusion’ (Cornish, 2006,
p. 465).
At this point, it is necessary to take a step back and consider the
psychological mechanisms at work. Evolutionary psychology has argued
that humankind has evolved moral heuristics, which are the ‘decision
rules that quickly produce social and moral judgements, based on limited
information’ (Cosmides & Tooby, 2006, p. 182). We make judgements
about groups continuously; for example, we are asked to vote in favour of
punitive or rehabilitative policies in relation to people who offend, or for
policies affecting those who seek benefits (Petersen & Aaroe, 2012). To
make these decisions, we need to first form an opinion about this group.
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to stigmatisation.
Yet there is a fundamental problem. Whereas we have evolved to
make moral judgements about specific individuals, the scale of modern
politics requires us to generalise about large groups (Petersen, 2009).
This means that whereas humankind evolved to make value judgements
about given others, such as one's neighbour Mary, for example, we are
often asked to make judgements about larger and diverse groups of
people whom we do not know personally. This includes being asked to
vote on policies that affect groups of people, such as penal policy. We
have to make a judgement about such groups without knowing all the
individuals that make up this group, and having not evolved to make
such large-scale judgements. Thus, the ‘general nature of modern polit-
ical debates clashes with the input conditions of evolved moral heuris-
tics’, which evolved as ‘context-sensitive systems’ (Petersen, 2009, p.
369).
This is where stereotypes become exceedingly important. Social
psychological research asserts that we utilise two systems for making
decisions (Kahneman, 2011, a review). System 1 operates upon implicit
assumptions about individuals and/or situations, with this information
being inputted in the format of images and metaphors (Berger, 2007).
Since this system is quick and not reliant on logical processing of infor-
mation, it relies on stereotypes. Stereotyped information is used to help us
form general political opinions about groups as a whole (category-based
inference) and operates as a ‘particular kind of decoupled cognition’
(Petersen & Aaroe, 2012, p. 811). Notably, Petersen (2009: 371) found
also that stereotyped information is especially powerful in helping us
make category-based inferences when these stereotypes ‘explicitly pic-
ture the relevant target group in an evolutionary significant way, such as
cheaters or exploiters’. Thus, stereotypes are especially powerful when
they are negative.
Prior to discussing the content of stereotypes, it is important to map
out the link between stereotypes, media, politics, and stigma. It is diffi-
cult to extrapolate any causal links between media coverage of penal
issues and public opinion (Mason, 2007). As Mason (2007) argues, the
media buttresses punitive and stigmatisatory responses more often than
individual members of the public. He notes that the media often provides
no evidence for its suggestion that the public is punitive. Indeed, the
public tends to be less punitive when actually informed about the sen-
tences given in real cases (eg Gelb, 2009) rather than asked general
questions about their attitudes to all people who offended. In the UK
context, Hough and Roberts (1999) found that the public tended to
under-estimate the severity of sentences when asked about sentencing of
people who offended generally. Yet when given a specific case-study of
an offence with contextual information such as the value of what was
stolen, about half of the respondents who were given a menu of
sentencing options including but not limited to imprisonment opted for a
sentence that did not involve time in prison. This was more lenient than
actual sentences in such cases and supports the view that when asked to
form an opinion about given individuals, the public is less likely to rely
on stereotypes.
Yet it is important to recognise that negative media and policy
discourse can often make families feel stigmatised even when no one
close to them does anything to stigmatise them overtly. The research
participants quoted earlier in this article spoke about feeling like society
was looking down on them and seeing them as bad people. We cannot
know whether people around them actually did hold these views; but the
fact that they felt stigmatised is nonetheless significant. In fact, instances
of actual stigmatisation (eg verbal abuse) may only reinforce this sense of
being seen as ‘less than’. As Mason (2007) found, ‘misleading and inac-
curate stories which construct prison and prisoners as high risk,
dangerous…not only bolster support for government policy built upon
mass incarceration, but construct public opinion as overtly supporting it
too’. Even if no one does anything to stigmatise given families, they
might feel socially stigmatised more broadly because the media conveys a
strongly negative, stereotyped view of people in prison and those3associated with them.
3.1. Stereotypes about offending and the role of the family
At this point, we need to discuss the content of prevalent stereotypes
about offending behaviour and about the role of the family in offending.
These stereotypes are what underlie the strong ‘courtesy stigma’ reported
by families of people in prison across numerous empirical studies (eg
Condry, 2007; Condry et al., 2016). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have
argued that when System 1 is used to make judgements, one key factor is
the availability heuristic. This refers to the ease with which the person
making the judgement can remember particular categories of people or
events. Thus, the more cases someone can recall of a particular portrayal
of families of people in prison, the more likely it is that the person will
hold a corresponding view of such families. The media, as well as cultural
and policy discourses are therefore important because both play key roles
in informing the public about families in this context.
There is a long-standing tradition within criminology to link the
family with criminal behaviour. Control theory (Gottfredson & Hirschi,
1990; Hirschi, 1969) places the blame for criminal behaviour at the feet
of the family, amongst other social institutions. According to this theory,
parents play an important role in instilling pro-social values within
children, and if the child's social ties are inadequate, he or she is more
likely to become delinquent. Although control theory also discusses other
institutions, such as schools, the stereotype of the criminal family is a
culturally and politically powerful one. It can be noted in books and
films, with Sons of Anarchy, The Sopranos and numerous films about the
Kray brothers being some examples. It is no surprise thus that Condry
(2007) found families being stigmatised on the grounds that they were of
the same ‘bad stock’ as their imprisoned relative, and for ‘failing’ to
control their offending relative. This theme was also highlighted in May’s
(2000: 204) work on families of people who committed murder. One
relative said that society feels families ‘come out of the same mould’, and
thus saw the family as bad by association.
Moreover, this discourse is prevalent within policy – family is often the
institution specifically blamed for delinquent behaviour (as opposed to
other institutions; this article will return to this interesting point). The
Troubled Families program, a UK program that aimed to help 120,000 of
the most “troubled” families in the country to turn their lives around via
helping thel address poor parenting patters, violence, and crime through
initiatives such as dedicated family workers. Under the program, the
government aimed to ‘halt the cycle of inter-generational dis-
advantage...seen in some families….where no-one is working or where
there is a history of inter-generational worklessness’ (HM Government,
2012, p. 43). Importantly, crime was explicitly one key issue the program
was introduced to tackle, thereby directly linking parenting with child-
hood deviance. This program has been strongly criticised for conflating
families with troubles like poverty and troublesome families causing un-
rest in and harm to neighbourhoods (Levitas, 2012). In fact, it found that
only a small minority of families involved in the program had any contact
with the criminal justice system or children with recorded offences
(Crossley, 2015). Yet this policy did reinforce the blameworthiness of the
family in the context of offending, as well as failing to recognise the need
to invest in other institutions such as community centres.
Another example is Parenting Orders – a type of court order that could
be used to compel a parent to control their child – under Section 58 of the
Criminal Justice Act 1991. Patten, the then-Minister of State for the
Home Office, stated that these orders were needed because ‘parents could
cope, but simply chose not to’ (Hansard, vol. 49, col. 767). Again, the
image of the irresponsible family shirking its responsibility for the child
was reinforced. This arguably failed to recognise that parents may
struggle to control their children for various reasons, such as needing to
work long hours to support the family financially, meantal health issues,
and single-parent household structures. These structural challenges were
considered (Burney& Gelsthorpe, 2008); and simplistic stereotypes were
once again fallen back on. As Foster (2017: 173) concluded, ‘a
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persistent contamination effect for families with a loved one involved in
the criminal justice system’.
3.2. Stereotypes about people in prison
Arditti, writing in the US context, pointed out that families operate
within a society that stigmatises imprisonment and prisoners (Arditti,
2012), which means that how we view people in prison will shape the
‘courtesy stigma’ experienced by their families. Again, stereotypes are
important here because people rarely step inside prisons and the only
available information about people in prison comes from the media. The
availability heuristic discussed earlier is especially relevant in this
context. The media in the UK, especially tabloid media, often portrays all
people in prison simplistically as mythical monsters, describing them
uniformly using terms like ‘thugs’ and ‘murderers’ (Mason, 2006). In one
case of a man convicted of killing his infant child, the issues raised by the
defence – such as his poor mental health – were almost entirely omitted
from the media coverage. Instead, headlines spoke of a ‘“Callous and
Brutal” Father’ (Cockroft, 2014, for Mailonline). In other words, the
media image of the person in prison is an extremely limited and distorted
one (Mason, 2006 and 2007).
The visibility heuristic is thus especially powerful in the context of
prisons, prisoners and people associated with them. Studies have shown
that the public are often very poorly acquainted with key areas of the
criminal justice system (eg Chapman, Mirrlees-Black, & Brawn, 2002);
more worryingly, above 90% believe their sources of information to be
accurate (Levenson, 2001). As discussed earlier, stereotypes become
more powerful when they speak to primal fears about being hurt or
exploited. Criminal behaviour, especially that which can result in a
prison sentence, is of course potentially dangerous and exploitative
behaviour. When discussing prisoners, the media often focuses on the
dangerous individuals - as mentioned above, those who commit murder
and rape. Yet this is a stereotype only - around 70% of people in prison in
England and Wales are convicted of non-violent crimes (Prison Reform
Trust, 2019). The image of the person in prison as dangerous and violent
therefore does not reflect reality; yet the stereotype remains prominent in
popular culture and media.
3.3. Stigmatising social injustice
Research also indicates families may be directly stigmatised because
they are overwhelmingly drawn from socially excluded populations (see
earlier discussion). Now, since most of the research into stigma experi-
enced by families of people in prison focused, unsurprisingly, on ‘cour-
tesy stigma’, we know very little about this direct stigmatisation, other
than the few quotes from studies that looked at experiences of families of
people in prison already discussed in this article.
What we do know is that forms of socio-economic exclusion, such as
poverty, are stigmatised, and that many of these families often experi-
ence numerous disadvatages, or, to use a term colleagues and I have used
elsewhere, social injustices (Condry et al., 2016, see also ; Arditti, 2012).
Social injustices refer to the ‘denial or violation of economic,
socio-cultural, political, civil, or human rights of specific populations or
groups in the society based on the perception of their inferiority’ (Levy&
Sidel, 2006, p. 6). Studies in the US (Sykes & Pettit, 2015) and Australia
(Besemer & Dennison, 2015) have found high levels of social exclusion
amongst families of people in prison. This includes relative financial
deprivation and unmet health needs. Significant economic disadvantage
and reliance on welfare benefits has been identified (Smith et al., 2007)
as a key issue for families in the UK. Thus, we need to recognise that
families of people in prison are drawn disproportionately from socially
excluded populations.
Poverty, claiming benefits and being of a lower socio-economic class
have all been linked with stigma. There is a long history of stigmatising
the poor: they were associated with crime and disease in the 16th and417th centuries (Geremek, 1997). Having certain characteristics, such as
being working class or claiming benefits, thus makes one, prima facie,
vulnerable to direct stigma (as opposed to courtesy stigma). This is often
because being poor carries stereotyped connotations of a lack of will-
power and the willingness to ‘live off the state’ (Janky, Bako, Szilagyi, &
Bognar, 2014). This stereotype is perpetrated in the media via the image
of the lazy ’benefits scrounger’ (Briant, Watson, & Philo, 2011) and that
of the working-class inner-city estate as being populated with the un-
derclass of failed individuals (Jones, 2011). A distinction is made,
therefore, within the popular discourse between the underclass (the
undeserving poor) and the respectable poor. In fact, Pemberton, Fahmy,
Sutton, and Bell (2016) found that people claiming benefits were acutely
aware of this stereotype, as portrayed on the popular UK tabloid talk
show, The Jeremy Kyle Show, and felt this was legitimising negative
social attitudes towards them. Such portrayals, in turn, activate our
evolved desire to protect ourselves from exploiters, and means that the
stereotype of the ‘benefits scrounger’ is a powerful one indeed.
3.4. Unequal distribution of stigma
It ought to be recognised that any analysis of stigma experienced by
families of people in prison needs to recognise the highly gendered and
racialized nature of the issue. It had long been recognised that women
play a vast role in supporting men and women in prison, and that women,
including partners of men in prison, mothers and sisters, typically look
after children of people in prison (see Condry, 2007). We thus need to
recognise how many of the families of people in prison may also be
stigmatised as women, specifically. Women are often blamed and even
indirectly punished for the wrongdoing of ‘their men’, such as sons and
husbands. Hunter and Nixon's (2001) study of evictions showed how
women were disproportionately held accountable when men in their
households acted antisocially. They even discuss one case where a judge
indicated that a young man's wrongdoing was understandable because
his mother was pregnant and thus failed to give him due attention,
thereby blaming her for his antisocial behaviour. Parenting Orders, too,
have been used to punish mothers, with as many as 90% of these orders
given to women (Peters, 2012).
The importance of race ought to also be recognised. In the US, Braman
(2004) found that ‘the presumption inherent in the stereotype [was] that
for them – a low-income black family in Southeast Washington, D.C. –
criminality [was] not an aberration’ [emphasis added]. Thus, racial
stereotypes might exacerbate overall stigma experienced by these fam-
ilies. Firstly, this is important because over 25% of people in prison in
England and Wales are BAME (Prison Reform Trust, 2019), which in-
dicates many of their families may be too. Secondly, racial stigma is
well-documented. The European Commission Against Racism and Intol-
erance (2016) recently noted that some British newspapers were guilty
of, for example, stereotyping Muslim people. Examples discussed in this
report included one The Sun article using the term ‘cockroaches’ to
describe migrants. The latter was clearly referring to Black migrants, as
the discussion was around Libyan refugees.
Finally, as already discussed in this article, class and the type of of-
fences involved may also mitigate or exacerbate the overall stigma
experienced by families of someone in prison. Fishman (1990), in the US
context, found that in working-class communities where imprisonment
was not uncommon, it was more likely to be seen as a crisis for the family
rather than a strongly stigmatising characteristic. Condry (2007) noted
that most of her participants did not come from such communities, but
even then not all experienced overt stigma. It may be that families for
whom offending is uncommonmight fear stigmamore often than actually
experience manifestations of it (Fishman, 1990). Likewise, some of-
fences, such as sexual ones, carry greater stigma than others. It is not
surprising therefore, that one of the relatives in Condry’s (2007: 89)
study stated that they felt ‘there's the definite stigma of it [the offence
their relative committed] being a sex offence’.
However, a family that is middle- or upper-class, for example, may
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be able to mitigate some of the ‘courtesy stigma’ by presenting them-
selves as different to the stereotype of the ‘typical’ family of someone in
prison. This is shown to be the case within the empirical literature. For
instance, Condry's (2007) participants often spoke of not being the ste-
reotypical ‘criminal family’. In the US, Braman (2004) found that some
families of people in prison engaged in distancing themselves from the
stereotype of the poor, Black, criminal ‘ghetto’ family. In doing so,
however, such families may be implicitly stigmatising those whom they
saw as fulfilling that steretype. This strategy to mitigate stigma might
also operate within socially excluded communities as well - for example,
Pemberton et al. (2016) found that people in poverty attempted to
differentiate themselves from the ‘shirkers’ and ‘scroungers’. This in-
dicates that families of people in prison who are experiencing numerous
forms of social exclusionmight not be able to mitigatemultiple stigmas in
this way. In fact, they may be stigmatised not only by society but also by
other families of people in prison.
4. Rational judgement and Association Value
Stereotyped information based on lack of contextual knowledge
might explain why strangers and society in general may stigmatise
families of people in prison, but empirical research also shows they are
often stigmatised by those who know them (friends, co-workers). For
example, in her study, Condry (2007) found that some of her participants
lost their friends after their relatives' imprisonment. It is worth noting
that the vast majority of her participants could not be described as being
criminal families in the stereotypical sense. Why are families sometimes
stigmatised by those who, it can be assumed, know them and their
backgrounds, and thus ought to rely less on negative stereotypes?
Notably, why do families that do not fulfil the stereotype of the criminal
family’ still experience ‘courtesy stigma’?
This can be explained via the second system (System 2) involved in
opinion formation, which operates via conscious processing of informa-
tion. Information is interrogated and evaluated, with logic being
engaged. This corresponds to existing research evidence, which has
shown that when people receive individualised information, they tend to
ignore categorical stereotyped information (Kunda& Sherman-Williams,
1993). In his study of political opinion formation, Petersen (2009) found
that when people were asked to form specific opinions about individual
people who offended, they were able to disregard stereotyped informa-
tion about offending.
We can understand why even those close to the families themselves
may stigmatise them using the concept of Association Value. Evolu-
tionary psychology has explored group dynamics and the context in
which groups adopt retaliatory or conciliatory responses to offending
behaviour (Petersen, Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2012). A reconciliatory
response is more likely to be adopted when the wrongdoer is kin, when
his or her social productivity is recognised, when he or she expresses
remorse, and when the wrongdoer and the members of the group making
the judgements are mutually dependent on each other (Petersen et al.,
2012). This work was focused on responses to people who offend rather
than their families, but there is no reason why the key thrust of the
argument cannot hold true for families too. What is key is whether the
person the judgement is being made about has a low or high perceived
Association Value. This is his or her value in relation to future in-
teractions with him or her.
The above discussion implies that those close to the families – their
friends or their relatives – ought not to stigmatise them. Again, empirical
evidence suggests that friends and families of those whose husbands and
other relatives are in prison tend to be quite supportive, despite families
fearing being stigmatised by those closest to them (eg Condry, 2007).
Most of the actual stigma tends to come from those outside of close cir-
cles, such as neighbours, acquaintances, and strangers on the street. This
indeed suggests that when System 2 is utilised, people experience less
stigma because stereotypes are less relied upon.5However, empirical evidence suggests that stigmatisation does occur
even in the context of very close relationships (eg Condry, 2007). Firstly,
this could be because the ‘courtesy stigma’ involved is so powerful that
having a relative in prison diminishes one's Association Value signifi-
cantly even if the family is otherwise an ordinary family. ‘Prisoner's
relative’ becomes the master status for the family; they become defined
by this overwhelmingly negative label and become people of Low Asso-
ciation Value even if they are ‘good people’. One participant in May's
(2000: 206) study said that she felt she had become ‘a completely
different person’ after her son was imprisoned for murder, and that she
was now a ‘murderer's Mum’. So, friends and neighbours might know the
family's individual circumstances and thus not be relying on stereotypes,
but still feel the low perceived Association Value of that family does not
make it worth interacting with them positively. Hence, non-aggressive
manifestations of stigma might occur, such as someone crossing the
street, or simply shunning the person in question by not inviting them to
family gatherings. Moreover, the families themselves might feel as
though they have become people of low Association Value and therefore
feel stigmatised even if no-one says or does anything to stigmatise them.
It is also critical to note that both Condry (2007) and May (2000) looked
at families of very serious offenders, which could mean that the seri-
ousness of the offencemagnified the stigma experienced by these families
by lowering their Association Value significantly.
Secondly, it may be extremely difficult to form a rational judgement
about families of someone in prison due to the lack of knowledge about
these families’ circumstances and characteristics. Secrecy is a commonly-
used coping strategy amongst these families (Condry, 2007), which may
result in those around them not knowing about their specific circum-
stances even if they are relatively close (eg friends or colleagues). This
might explain why research (Condry, 2007) has found that close relatives
do not usually stigmatise partners and other relatives of those in prison as
often as neighbours and acquaintances. Although these neighbours pre-
sumably knew the people they were stigmatising, it is possible that they
were still reliant on cultural and media stereotypes about offending and
the role of the family in offending, as well as socially excluded pop-
ulations. This could be because they did not have access to all the in-
formation necessary to engage System 2, because families of those in
prison are reluctant to share information about their status either at all,
or beyond a very close circle of trusted friends and family (see Condry,
2007).
5. Neoliberalism and the weaponisation of stigma
Thus far, I have argued that families of people in prison experience
‘courtesy stigma’ by virtue of their association to someone who has
offended, and, often, direct stigma by virtue of their social exclusion.
There is, however, reason to suspect that neoliberalism has in recent
years acted to magnify both sources of stigma. Neoliberlaism is a broad
concept, and one that is often used heterogeneously (Birch & Springer,
2019). A lengthy discussion of debates surrounding neoliberalism is
outside of the scope of this article, but for the purpose of this article I am
interested in neoliberalism as a class project ‘combining the dispossession
of the commons with forms of ideological hegemony’ (Birch & Springer,
2019, p. 471). Under the guise of individualism, mobility and freedom of
choice, the class power of elites is maintained and a sub-class of ‘wasted
humans’ is produced (Tyler, 2013).
Beyond simply a class exercise, the elites also utilise neoliberalism as
a form of governance (Tyler, 2013). Since poverty is deemend to be a
result of rational choice and fecklessness, the retraction of the welfare
state and harsh penal policies are justified. Harsh sanctions for not
complying with increasingly demanding and complex welfare benefits
rules and regulations is one example (Shildrick, MacDonald, Webster, &
Garthwaite, 2013). Thus, people on benefits are perceived to be ‘similes
of criminals’ (Wacquant, 2009, p. 60) to be punished. In the context of
this article, neoliberalism serves a dual function. It reinforces the devi-
ance of people in prison, thereby strengthening the courtesy stigma
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stigma, since many of the families this article is concerned with are
socio-economically excluded.
Scambler (2018) has argued that recent decades have seen a rather
distinct phenomenon: the weaponisation of stigma by the neoliberal
state. Although space precludes a fuller discussion of these themes, it is
important to recognise the role this weaponisation played within the
stigmatisation of families of people in prison. Scambler (2018) rightly
argues that modern neoliberal states such as the UK do not just stigmatise
characteristics such as poverty. This stigma has been weaponised. This
means that the stigma is married to deviance – thus, people living in
poverty for example are not just seen as people of Low Association Value
but as deviant people. The Troubled Families programme can be used to
illustrate this political weaponisation of neoliberalism. The individualism
inherent in neoliberal politics sees people in prison and their families as
wholly responsible for their plight, and ignores any contextual social
injustices such as poverty and exclusion. For example, the Oxford Mail's
recent response to concern about the effect of reporting on children of
people who commit crime was ‘you should have thought about the
consequences before committing a crime’ (Walker, 2019).
6. A multi-faceted model of stigmatisation of families of people in
prison
Fig. 1 summarises the processes of stigmatisation developed in this
article. The psychological mechanism of opinion formation is the natural
starting point for any concept that is inherently rooted in a negative
opinion of another – which is precisely what stigmatisation is. Yet to
unpack stigmatisation it is important to consider System 1 and System 2:Fig. 1. A multi-faceted and cumulative model of stigmatisation of families of
people in prison.
6that is, generalised negative opinions that rely on stereotypes and indi-
vidualised opinions about specific families or relatives that are based
upon specific information and rational thought.
The first pathway to stigma is that operated by System 2. This is when
an individual makes a rational judgement, having considered the avail-
able evidence, as to whether to stigmatise a given family of someone who
has offended or not. This is usually only possible when you know that
family (since we have access to detailed information about our friends
and relatives etc), as without knowledge of their circumstances it is
arguably not possible to engage System 2.
As discussed earlier, families report less stigma from those close to
them, such as their friends. This could be because System 2 leads people
to not stigmatise them, as they realise that these families are usually
perfectly ordinary people. However, when families are stigmatised by
those close to them, this could be because they are deemed to be people
of low Association Value. It is perhaps easier to shun or avoid someone
‘tainted’ by their connection to a person in prison than to retain a rela-
tionship with them, even if you do not actually think they are ‘bad
people’ themselves. As has also been discussed, poverty and other forms
of social injustice carry stigma in themselves. We might feel sorry for a
family we know, but still avoid or shun them because they are not only
connected to someone in prison but also because they are, for example,
on benefits. This stigma of social exclusion, as it has been argued in this
article, has also been further weaponised so we are inclined to think of
people who offend and those on benefits (and other groups) as respon-
sible for their misfortune and thus as bad people. This further enhances
direct stigma.
The second route to stigmatisation of families of people in prison,
and, arguably, the most common one, is via System 1. This system of
judgement-making relies on quick judgement constructed upon stereo-
types. As has been discussed earlier, families of people in prison exist
within a complex intersection of negative stereotypes. Firstly, there are
the stereotypes about the role family plays in offending. Families are seen
as having failed to control their misbehaving relatives, and therefore
indirectly blameworthy. There are also powerful biologistic stereotypes
about ‘bad blood’, meaning that if someone in a family is in prison, so-
ciety assumes that the whole family is deviant. This drives the courtesy
stigma and the ‘web of shame’ discussed by Condry (2007).
Moreover, many of these families experience a range of social in-
justices, such as socio-economic exclusion. These carry stigma, and serve
to further enhance the stereotype of the feckless, lazy, criminal ‘under-
class’. Again, this has recently been further weaponised by the political
class and the media to justify a punitive approach to not just people who
offend, but also to those living in poverty. Being linked to someone in
prison therefore reinforces the societal view of families of people in
prison simplistically as a subgroup that exhibits the worst features of
humanity: crime, laziness, willingness to exploit state benevolence, and
so on.
Of course, stereotypes can also reinforce direct stigma. Stereotypes
can override rational choice; for example, unless we know someone very
closely, we might assume that ‘everything we knew about them was
wrong’ if someone in their family goes to prison. The master status of
‘prisoner's family’ takes over and we might discount the fact that they
might, for example, be otherwise good neighbours. This could explain
why those who knew individual families but not too closely – acquain-
tances, neighbours, colleagues –weremore likely to stigmatise them than
close relatives were.
Moreover, we need to question the extent to which System 1 is
actually widely used in this context. In general, we know very little of the
experiences of families of people in prison. Due to shame and fear of
stigma, these families are often reluctant to disclose details of their ex-
periences, and they are rarely discussed in the media in any depth or with
nuance. This could mean that System 1 is more likely to be used when
making a judgement about a family of someone in prison, and this
overwhelmingly relies on stereotypes. Finally, direct stigma and courtesy
stigma reinforce each other – they do not operate separately. A relative of
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economic status might further reinforce the stereotype that all families
of people in prison are feckless benefits scroungers, for example.
7. Conclusion
Stigmatisation occurs within a particular social context, and is
therefore a messy, complex social phenomenon. Underlying manifesta-
tions of stigma – shunning, physical and verbal abuse – is the view that
the subject of stigmatisation is ‘less than’, a person with a discredited
identity. Social psychology and the work on evolved heuristics has
stressed the importance of stereotypes and perceived Association Value
in making judgements about people, and ought to be used when trying to
theorise stigma in all contexts. After all, negative judgements are the
basis for why people are stigmatised.
‘Courtesy stigma’ is of course an important concept when thinking
about the experiences of people in prison. It is unsurprising that being
someone related to an individual in prison means that primal notions of
‘bad blood’ are activated within those making judgements about the
person in question. Nonetheless, Condry's (2007) ‘web of shame’ is
limited because it focuses solely on ‘courtesy stigma’ and does not pro-
vide a careful analysis of the underlying biologistic stereotypes about the
role families play in offending behaviours.
This article has argued that families of people in prison are stigma-
tised for who they are in addition to who they are linked to. Many of these
families are stigmatised because they are poor, working-class, and also
because they are women and/or BAME. Yet these additional dimensions
of stigma have not yet been meaningfully engaged with in the literature,
despite empirical work on families of people in prison hinting that these
characteristics may also carry stigma. In fact, research on race and on
welfare benefits has long shown that race and poverty carry stigma. We
also know that women are often blamed for the wrongdoings of ‘their’
men. Finally, it has been argued that stigma has, in recent years, been
actively weaponised by the neoliberal state to conflate social exclusion
with deviance.
Although this framework focuses on the UK context and on families of
people in prison specifically, it is flexible and nuanced enough to be
useful when considering other stigmatised groups. For example, it could
be used to understand why families of people with disabilities andmental
illness are stigmatised. It also allows for a consideration of the unequal
distribution of stigma and accounts for why those living in poverty, fe-
male relatives and BAME relatives might experience more stigma than
White, middle-class families. Time has certainly come for a social un-
derstanding of stigma; unless and until we recognise that it is rooted in
fundamental social injustices and constructed upon socio-cultural ste-
reotypes, we cannot meaningfully say we understand how stigma
operates.
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